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19731 DOMINANT MOTIVATION TEST
Income Tax-Dominant Motivation Test Adopted For Business Bad
Debts
The United States Supreme Court, in United States v. Generes,'
has attempted to provide a suitable test for distinguishing business bad
debts from nonbusiness bad debts sustained by the individual taxpayer.
2
The distinction is an important one for the taxpayer because of the wide
divergence in the tax treatment of the two; the business bad debt receives
by far the greater tax benefits.3 However, the Court has provided a test
that will prove to be one of great difficulty in practice for the taxpayer.
'405 U.S. 93 (1972).
'INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 166 provides in part:
(a) GENERAL RULE.-
(I) Wholly worthless debts.-There shall be allo wed as a deduction any debt
which becomes worthless within the taxable year.
(d) NONBUSINEss DEBTS.-
(I) General rule.-In the case of a taxpayer other than a corporation-
(B) where any nonbusiness debt becomes worthless within the taxable
year, the losses resulting therefrom shall be considered a loss from the
sale or exchange, during the taxable year, of a capital asset held for
not more than 6 months.
(2) Nonbusiness debt defined.-For purposes of paragraph (1), the term "non-
business debt" means a debt other than-
(A) a debt created or acquired (as the case may be) in connection
with a trade or business of the taxpayer; or
(B) a debt the loss from the worthlessness of which is incurred in the
taxpayer's trade or business.
Section 166(f), which deals with the categorization of business and nonbusiness debts in connection
with the guarantor of certain noncorporate obligations, does not apply here since the obligation
was clearly corporate.
Treas. Reg. § 1.166-5(b)(2) (1959) provides in part:
(2) . . . . The question whether a debt is a nonbusiness debt is a question of fact in
each particular case. . . .For purposes of subparagraph (2) of this paragraph, the
character of the debt is to be determined by the relation which the loss resulting from
the debt's becoming worthless bears to the trade or business of the taxpayer. If that
relation is a proximate one in the conduct of the trade or business in which the taxpayer
is engaged at the time the debt becomes worthless, the debt comes within the exception
provided by that subparagraph.
(Emphasis added.)
3A nonbusiness bad debt is treated as a short-term capital loss subject to restrictions
of § 166(d)(1)(B) and §§ 1211 and 1212 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954. Nonbusiness debts
are also restricted by § 172(d)(4) of the Code for carryback purposes. Business bad debts, on the
other hand, may be deducted against ordinary income; and the taxpayer is allowed to assert net
operating loss carrybacks under section 172 of the Code for the unused portion of the claimed bad
debt deduction. 405 U.S. at 95-96.
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The test, which focuses on the "dominant motivation"' of the taxpayer,
calls for a complex and difficult assessment by the trier of fact-an
assessment that may be set aside on review only if found clearly erro-
neous.
5
The Generes case involves the gray middle ground of the business
and nonbusiness classifications under federal tax law. Generes was both
an employee and a shareholder in a family-owned and -operated con-
struction business. He thus had both a business and a nonbusiness inter-
est in the corporation. The taxpayer's status as an employee qualified
his interest as a business interest, while his role as a shareholder gave
him a nonbusiness interest.6 But the debt, for tax purposes, must be
classed as either business or nonbusiness-it may not be apportioned.,
The taxpayer, who was president of the corporation, owned forty-
four percent of its stock (on an original investment of 38,900 dollars).
His employment with the business paid him 12,000 dollars a year for a
work week of no more than six to eight hours. The taxpayer's work
included reviewing bids and jobs, seeking and obtaining bank financing,
making cost estimates, and assisting in securing bid and performance
bonds. Other members of his family, including a son and two sons-in-
law, owned the remainder of the stock in the corporation. Generes' total
income averaged about 40,000 dollars a year from 1959 to 1962; some
19,000 dollars of this was received annually from a full-time position
Generes held as president of a savings and loan association.'
In 1958 the taxpayer signed a personal agreement with a surety to
indemnify the surety for any loss suffered by it in underwriting the
corporation's contractual obligations.' The construction corporation in
1d. at 103-05.
'INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 7482(a), provides that decisions of the Tax Court shall be
reviewed by the United States Court of Appeals "in the same manner and to the same extent as
decisions of the district courts in civil actions tried without a jury ...." Thus, findings of fact
by the Tax Court will not be disturbed on review unless they are clearly erroneous. FED. R. Civ.
P. 52(a).
1405 U.S. at 100-01. Since salary as an employee generates ordinary income and is taxed as
such, a loss suffered by the taxpayer in protecting his salary will be allowed to offset ordinary
income. On the other hand, an investor realizes capital gains on the appreciation of his investment.
Due to the more favorable tax treatment allowed capital gains, as compared with ordinary income,
bad debts incurred to protect an investment will correspondingly be treated as capital losses and
offsets to ordinary income will be restricted under § 1211. See note 3 supra.
1405 U.S. at 96.
VId. at 97-98.
'it is a common practice for shareholders of a close corporation, as here, to be required to




1962 defaulted on two project contracts, and the taxpayer indemnified
the surety to the extent of 162,104.57 dollars. The corporation went into
receivership before the taxpayer was reimbursed, and the debt was not
repaid. On his 1962 tax return the taxpayer claimed the loss as a busi-
ness bad debt and deducted it from his ordinary income. Later he filed
claims for refunds for the years 1959-1961, asserting net operating loss
carrybacks under section 172 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 for
the unused portion of the claimed bad debt deduction."0 The Internal
Revenue Service disallowed the claims, and Generes brought them be-
fore a jury in a suit for refunds in federal district court. At trial the
taxpayer testified that his sole motive in making the indemnity agree-
ment was to protect his employment with the corporation. The district
court charged the jury, over the government's objection, that a "signifi-
cant motivation" satisfied the requirement of the regulations that a
business bad debt be "proximately related to" the trade or business of
the taxpayer at the time the debt becomes worthless." Judgment for
the taxpayer resulted, and the government appealed. The Fifth Circuit
approved the significant motivation standard and affirmed."2
A writ of certiorari was granted by the Supreme Court to resolve
a conflict among the circuits as to whether a significant or dominant
motivation test should be applied.1 3 The Court rejected the significant
motivation test adopted by both the Second and Fifth Circuits and ruled
with the Seventh Circuit in adopting a test of dominant motivation for
determining the proximity of the relationship between the debt and the
taxpayer's trade or business. Using this test, the Court found that the
debt sustained by the taxpayer Generes was a nonbusiness bad debt
14
and must treated as a short-term capital loss. 15 The distinction between
"1405 U.S. at 98-99.
"Id. at 99. The Regulation is reproduced in part in note 2 supra.
"United States v. Generes, 427 F.2d 279 (5th Cir. 1970). See generally 3 Sw. U.L. REv. 135
(1971); 2 TEX. TECH L. REv. 318 (1971); 28 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 161 (1971).
1"405 U.S. at 96.
"The Court ordered a judgment n.o.v. to be entered, stating:
The conclusion we have reached means that the District Court's instructions, based
on a standard of significant rather than dominant motivation, are erroneous and that,
at least, a new trial is required. We have examined the record, however, and find nothing
that would support a jury verdict in this taxpayer's favor had the dominant motivation
standard been embodied in the instructions. Judgment n.o.v. for the United States,
therefore, must be ordered.
The Court dismissed the taxpayer's own testimony as self-serving. Id. at 106.
1Id. at 96.
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business and nonbusiness bad debts meant a difference of over 40,000
dollars in taxes for Generes.
In his opinion for the Court, Justice Blackmun noted the difference
between the business and nonbusiness interests of the taxpayer. As a
shareholder Generes had a nonbusiness interest. "It was capital in na-
ture and it was comprised initially of tax-paid dollars. Its rewards were
expectative and would flow not from personal effort, but from invest-
ment earnings and appreciation."' 6 Generes' status as an employee was
a business interest: "Its nature centered in personal effort and labor, and
salary for that endeavor would be received. The salary would consist of
pre-tax dollars.' '
7
The Court cited the factors that led it to approve the dominant
motive test: consistency with other sections of the Internal Revenue
Code that deal with a business-nonbusiness distinction," consistency
with the Code's objectives and with an earlier decision of the Court,"
and the superior workability of the dominant motivation standard. In
attributing workability to the test, the Court noted that "[t]he trier...
may compare the risk against the potential reward and give proper
emphasis to the objective rather that to the subjective."2 The Court
added:
By making the dominant motivation the measure, the logical tax con-
sequence ensues and prevents the mere presence of a business motive,
however small and however insignificant, from controlling the tax re-
sult at the taxpayer's convenience. This is of particular importance in
a tax system which is so largely dependent on voluntary compliance.,
"Id. at 100-01.
'Id. at 101.
"'The Code, Justice Blackmun said, carefully distinguishes between business and nonbusiness
items. In § 165, 162, and 166, the Code allows particular benefits for business losses, business
expenses, and business bad debts, respectively. Many of these benefits are not available for nonbusi-
ness losses, expenses, and bad debts. Justice Blackmun concluded that application of the significant
motivation test to bad debts would have the effect of obliterating or blunting the meaningful
distinction Congress intended between business and nonbusiness bad debts. Id. at 103-04. The
Court also contended that the dominant motivation test strengthens and is consistent with the
mandate of § 262 that "'no deduction be allowed for personal, living, or family expenses' except
as otherwise provided." The dominant motivation test, the Court added, "prevents personal consid-
erations from circumventing this provision." Id. at 104-05.
"The Court asserted that the significant motivation test would "undermine and circumscribe"
an earlier decision by the Court in Whipple v. Commissioner, 373 U.S. 193 (1963). The Court noted
that Whipple emphasized that a "shareholder's mere activity in a corporation's affairs is not a trade
or business." 405 U.S. at 104.




The Court summarily rejected arguments that this decision is in-
consistent with the Court's approval of a significant motivation stan-
dard for liability for the accumulated earnings tax under section 531 and
for inclusion in the gross estate of a transfer made in contemplation of
death under section 2035.22 The Court also rejected definition of the
term "proximate" in the tort sense.23
In applying the test of dominant motivation to the Generes situa-
tion, the majority evaluated the taxpayer's salary and his investment in
light of the surety obligation he assumed. The Court concluded that
"reasonable minds could not ascribe . . . a dominant motivation...
to the preservation of the taxpayer's salary .... ,21
Justice Douglas, in dissent, contended that the adoption of the
dominant motivation test was an improper use of the Court to iron out
ambiguity in the regulations. Repeating an argument he had made sev-
eral times before,21 Justice Douglas urged that the responsible remedy
for ambiguity in the regulations or the Act was not judicial.
26
No test or guide is offered in section 166 of the Code for determin-
2Jd. at 105. The Court cited in substantiation United States v. Donruss Co., 393 U.S. 297,
303 (1969), and Farmers' Loan & Trust Co. v. Bowers, 98 F.2d 794 (2d Cir. 1938), cert. denied,
396 U.S. 648 (1939). The application of a significant motivation standard in both § 531
and § 2035 favors the Government. Under Donruss, if tax avoidance is a significant purpose of
an unreasonable accumulation of corporate earnings, then there will be a § 531 inclusion. Bowers
provides that if a motive to avoid estate taxes played a "substantial" part in motivating pre-death
transfers, then there will be inclusion in the gross estate under the "in contemplation of death"
criterion of § 2035. The Court stated in Generes that: "Sections 531 and 2035 are Congress'
answer to tax avoidance activity." 405 U.S. at 105.
n405 U.S. at 105.
11d. at 107. In a concurring opinion, Justice Marshall added emphasis in the area of legislative
history, concluding that the significant motivation test is wholly at odds with the goals of Congress.
Id. at 107-12.
"Justice Douglas cited as indicative his dissent in United States v. Skelly Oil Co., 394 U.S.
678, 690-91 (1969).
21Justice Douglas explained that the ironing out of ambiguity in the Regulations or the Act
requires "either a recasting of the Regulations by Treasury or presentation of the problem to the
Joint Committee on Internal Revenue Taxation which is a standing committee of the Congress
that regularly rewrites the Act and is much abler than are we in forecasting revenue needs and
spotting loopholes where abuses thrive." 405 U.S. at 114-15. Justice Douglas added that "[r]esort
to litigation, rather than to Congress, for a change in the law is too often the temptation of
government which has a larger purse and more endurance than any taxpayer." 405 U.S. at 115.
Justice Douglas also noted that Generes' assumption of the obligation was "proximately"
related to his trade or business as the Regulations require. The bond was essential for the continued
operation of the enterprise, and therefore the bond's assumption was required for Generes to
maintain his job. "Whether it was a prudent act is not our concern. Nor is it our concern whether
with the benefit of hindsight we can now say that signing the bond entailed risks wholly dispropor-
tionate to the stake Generes had in maintaining a job with a $12,000 a year salary." Id. at 114.
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ing when a bad debt is a business bad debt. However, the regulations,
as previously noted, do provide that the debt must be "a proximate one
in the trade or business in which the taxpayer is engaged at the time the
debt becomes worthless"' 7 in order to qualify as a business bad debt. In
1963 the Supreme Court, in Whipple v. Commissioner,21 indicated its
approval of the proximate-relation test of the regulations by refusing to
recognize a debt as a business bad debt where there was "no proof
(which might be difficult to furnish where a taxpayer is the sole or
dominant stockholder) that the loan was necessary to keep his job or
was otherwise proximately related to maintaining his trade or business
as an employee." 2 The Court in Whipple, as the Court's opinion in
Generes points out,3 also noted the special difficulty of distinguishing
between business and nonbusiness bad debts where the taxpayer is both
an employee and a shareholder:
Even if the taxpayer demonstrates an independent trade or business of
his own, care must be taken to distinguish bad debt losses arising from
his own business and those actually arising from activities peculiar to
an investor concerned with, and participating in, the conduct of the
corporate business. 31
Whipple has been interpreted in various ways: lower courts by turns
have used it to justify the application of both the dominant and the
significant motivation standards. The Second Circuit in late 1963 en-
dorsed the test of significant motivation in Weddle v. Commissioner,2
in which the majority pointed out that a requirement that the business
motivation be primary was simply not present in either the statute or
the regulations. Looking to the law of torts, which often uses the term
"proximate," the majority determined that a cause may be proximate
even though it is "secondary. ' 33 In a concurring opinion,34 Chief
Judge Lumbard endorsed the primary motivation standard. He con-
tended that the test of significant motivation would always yield a judg-
ment for the taxpayer, and he rejected the analogy to tort law.
2Treas. Reg. § 1.166-5 (1959), quoted note 2 supra.
-373 U.S. 193 (1963); see note 19 supra.
21373 U.S. at 204 (emphasis added).
10405 U.S. at 102.
31373 U.S. at 202.





Despite this attempt in Weddle to determine the proper test for
gauging the proximity of the relationship between the debt and the
taxpayer's trade or business, many of the cases decided after Weddle
did not invoke any particular test to analyze proximity.35 But in 1969,
in Niblock v. Commissioner,36 the Seventh Circuit adopted the domi-
nant motivation standard, stating that it was the only test capable of
injecting sufficient certainty into the interpretation of section 166. The




The Supreme Court's endorsement in Generes of the Seventh Cir-
cuit's dominant motivation standard involves the federal judiciary in the
complex inquiry into taxpayer motivation. The newly adopted standard,
despite the statement of Justice Blackmun attributing "workability"
38
to it, may well prove to be more difficult to apply and may result in
many inconsistent judgments. Motivation is highly elusive of effective
evaluation. Men act and react for a multitude of reasons on the basis
of stimuli that even they themselves often fail to recognize or appreciate
fully. The more the courts are required to rely on the fact finder's
assessment of the effect of these stimuli on taxpayer behavior, the more
unsatisfactory become the dispositions that necessarily rely on that as-
sessment. It is much easier to discover the presence or absence of a
substantial business motivation than to determine whether a motivation
is sufficiently substantial to be "dominant."
A further complication in the balancing of the motives is the defini-
tion of the key word "dominant." The Court does not define the term,
and the trier of fact is left with a term that is just as ambiguous as the
term "proximate" used in the regulations.39 Does "dominant" mean
the largest motive,4" as for example a thirty percent motive with three
"1See, e.g., Stratmore v. United States, 420 F.2d 461 (3d Cir. 1970); Lundgren v. Commis-
sioner, 376 F.2d 623 (9th Cir. 1967); United States v. Clark, 358 F.2d 892 (1st Cir. 1966); Kelly
v. Patterson, 331 F.2d 753 (5th Cir. 1964).
-417 F.2d 1185 (7th Cir. 1969).
11Id. at 1187.
11405 U.S. at 104.
"'See note 2 supra.
"0While there are only two categories of interest, business and nonbusiness, there are a multi-
tude of motives that may be classified under each. It is not just the weighing of the two categories
which is necessary. Were this the case the term dominant could only mean fifty-plus percent.
Rather, the trier of fact is confronted in actuality with the various motives themselves, unclassified,
and must proceed from there to find the dominant motivation. Generes leaves unanswered the
question of whether the trier of fact is obligated to classify motivational forces into the two
19731
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other lesser ones of twenty-five, twenty-five, and twenty percent magni-
tude? Or must a motive be fifty-plus percent, dwarfing all other motives
regardless of number? What if two motives-one business and one non-
business'-are so closely related in size as to be indistinguishable, with
neither one "dominant"? The difficulty inherent in such an undertaking
is obvious.
The most credible reason the Court gives for the stricter test is its
fear of loopholes. But the Court's remedy for potential abuse may deny
some taxpayers deductions to which they should be entitled.', The tax-
payer, as noted in Whipple,4 2 has the burden of establishing that the
relationship to his trade or business is proximate. The dominant motiva-
tion standard as a practical matter requires him to explain away any
motive that is not strictly business. As in Generes, the taxpayer's testi-
mony that a nonbusiness interest did not figure in his decision will often
be deemed self-serving, so the taxpayer must be able to adduce other
evidence to explain his motives. In such a situation, the taxpayer's
dominant motivation might in fact be a business one-to protect his
job-while a jury might find his primary motivation to be the protection
of his investment in the business. Numerous inconsistent judgments may
result. Two separate triers of fact faced with two identical fact situations
may reach opposing results because of the ambiguity of the test. A
taxpayer attempting to determine in advance if his loan or assumption
of debt for his corporation will later be classified as business-motivated
for tax purposes will find little guidance in previous cases in which the
standard has been applied. 3 Since a finding of dominant motivation is
categories and then reach a decision, or whether the decision may be based on the raw factors
themselves unclassified. In the latter situation, with three factors or more, the trier might look to
the largest of the factors rather than the larger of the two categories.
"In essence, the Court has simply made a judicial determination that in cases involving
employee-shareholder bad debts, as here, the taxpayer is going to lose in the majority of the cases.
This'result, which is achieved by the application of the harsher dominant motivation standard,
makes it easier for the Commissioner to achieve a favorable ruling in cases of this nature due to
the heavier burden placed on the taxpayer. However, it is doubtful that such an approach may be
justified in regard to any concept of fair and equitable taxation. Without apportionment and with
the burden weighing so heavily on the taxpayer, the probable result is that taxpayers will often be
denied in fact those tax benefits which are due them in theory.
12373 U.S. at 202.
13Advance rulings or determination letters would probably not be available due to the inher-
ently factual nature of any determination of dominant motivation. Rev. Proc. 72-9(2), 1972-I Cu,.
BULL. 28 provides in part:
It is the policy of the Service to answer inquiries of individuals and organizations,
whenever appropriate in the interest of sound tax administration, as to their status for
[Vol. 51
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factual, the taxpayer's opportunity to obtain reversal on appeal will be
greatly diminished.
The Court's justification for adopting the dominant motivation
standard pales considerably in light of the difficulty and uncertainty
inherent in its application. The "workability" attributed to the new
standard by the Court is not likely to materialize. The idea that the
"trier . . may compare the risk against the potential reward and give
proper emphasis to the objective rather than the subjective"" may have
merit in clear-cut situations, but it is an oversimplification in the major-
ity of cases, which will involve closer questions.
The Court's view that the dominant motivation test makes section
166 consistent with other sections of the Tax Code is of mitiimal signifi-
cance in view of the prospect of mass inconsistency among section 166
decisions themselves. But the significance of the Generes decision is
much broader than its section 166 application. In Leonard F.
Cremona," a tax court case decided in the wake of Generes, two concur-
ring judges suggested that the Generes dominant motivation test be
applied to differentiate between business and nonbusiness expenses
under section 162. Perhaps most important of all are the implications
of Generes for the "business purpose" requirement of tax-free corporate
reorganizations and divisions. To qualify as tax-free, these corporate
realignments in addition to satisfying statutory mechnical requirements
must meet judicially imposed conditions that include a requirement that
there be a "business purpose" motivating the transaction.46 A change
in the character of this requirement from some business purpose to a
dominant business purpose would place both the corporate taxpayer and
its shareholders in a quandary similar to that of the shareholder-
employee in Generes. The problem is intensified by the much larger
tax purposes and as to the tax effects of their acts or transactions, prior to their filing
of returns or reports as required by the revenue laws.
There are, however, certain areas where, because of the inherently factual nature
of the problems involved, or for other reasons, the Service will not issue advance rulings
or determination letters.
The areas in which no advance rulings will be issued are enumerated in Rev. Proc. 72-9. Expansion
of this list to include the determination of the dominant motivation of a shareholder-employee bad
debt seems an inevitable occurrence.
11405 U.S. at 104.
4558 T.C. 219 (1972).
6The "business purpose" requirement was first articulated in Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U.S.
465 (1935). For a discussion of the "business purpose" requirement see J. SCOTT, FEDERAL INCOME
TAXATION OF CORPORATE REORGANIZATIONS AND DIvisIONS 97-101 (1972).
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sums involved in these corporate transactions. The injection of this
element of uncertainty'into corporate planning would result in a severe
impediment to the effective use of these tax-free corporate reorganiza-
tions and divisions.
EDGAR M. ROACH JR.
Labor Law-Union Discipline of Supervisor Members
Section 8(b)(1) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended,'
(hereinafter called the Act) provides the statutory framework within
which labor unions exercise disciplinary control over their members.'
The general rule, based upon NLRB v. Allis-Chalmers Manufacturing
Co., 3 is that such discipline is a legitimate, internal union matter rarely
subject to interference from the courts.' A trend' in the courts of appeals
indicates, however, that the Allis-Chalmers doctrine does not apply
where the disciplined member happens to be a supervisor.' In two recent
'National Labor Relations Act §§ 1-18, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-68 (1970) [hereinafter cited as
NLRA].
2NLRA § 8(b)(l), 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(1) (1970) provides in part:
It shall be an unfair labor practice for a labor organization or its agencies-
(1) to restrain or coerce (a) employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed
in section 157 of this title: Provided, that this paragraph shall not impair the right of a
labor organization to prescribe its own rules with respect to the acquisition or retention
of membership therein ....
NLRA § 7, 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1970) provides in part:
Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor
organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing, and
to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other
mutual aid or protection, and shall also have the right to refrain from any or all of such
activities except to the extent that such right may be affected by an agreement requiring
membership in a labor organization as a condition of employment ....
3388 U.S. 175 (1967).
4In Allis-Chalmers the union had imposed fines upon employee members who had crossed
picket lines and continued to work during a strike in support of new contract demands. In finding
that the fines did not violate § 8(b)(1)(A), the Court concluded that "Congress did not propose
any limitations with respect to the internal affairs of unions, aside from barring enforcement of a
union's internal regulations to affect a member's employment status." 388 U.S. at 195.
The Allis-Chalmers doctrine had a slight gloss put on it in 1969. In Scofield v. NLRB, 394
U.S. 423 (1969), the Supreme Court added that union fines of members would not viola.
te § 8(b)(l)(A) "unless some impairment of a statutory labor policy [could] be shown." Id. at 432,
5See text accompanying notes 31-35 infra.
'See note 18 and accompanying text infra, regarding supervisors as union members.
